So, we’ve heard this before from George Weigel:
Rather than expending fruitless energies defending the social welfare state as we know it—in the first few months of 2012, the bishops’ conference (as represented by its domestic policy committee) issued letters urging renewed or expanded funding for some 20 federal social welfare programs—the Catholic Church in the United States should be at the forefront of exploring the path beyond the welfare state, stressing the moral and cultural dimensions of that necessary journey. The Church has no special expertise in the technicalities of public policy; and in any event, the Church ought never have measured “social justice” by budget line-items.
Micheal Sean Winters responded:
I challenge the bishops to decline to publish Mr. Weigel’s columns until he publicly affirms that he is willing to submit his intellect and will to the Church’s teaching he is currently so keen to attack. He writes: “Catholic social doctrine is a tradition of moral realism: it takes facts seriously. And the increasing burden of the evidence is that the social welfare state as we have known it is dying—and in fact deserves to die.” No, sir. The burden of evidence merely shows that you are publicly dissenting from the teachings of the Church.
And then yesterday Rick Garnett defended Weigel against Winters:
It cannot be the case — and it is not the case — that embrace of the Church’s social teaching and magisterium requires, or even advises, us to support current policy with respect to, say, social-welfare programs and spending, or public-sector unionism. It is sometimes hackery, but in any event it’s mistaken, to assert (as some in recent months have done) that, “because the Church supports unions, it’s contrary to Church teaching to criticize public-employee unions,” or to claim that “because the Church teaches that the political community has an obligation to the vulnerable, it’s contrary to Church teaching to express concerns about the costs, efficiency, and long-term sustainability of current social-welfare-spending practices.”
I wonder if Winters and Garnett be reconciled on this. Garnett is of course correct that public policy is a prudential judgment based on matters of doctrine, but there is sometimes significant complexity involved in determining whether what is being contested by the Catholic (economic) right is a prudential judgement about policy or matter of doctrine. For instance, Catholic Social Doctrine proposes that all workers have a right to a “living wage.” One may, for instance, argue about what constitutes a living wage given a current set of social considerations…and that is one thing. But to argue, as some on the Catholic (economic) right do, that it should simply be a market alone which determines wages seems to dissent from Catholic Social Doctrine.
In addition, there at least appear to be clear doctrines–distinct from prudential judgments about public policy–that are also called into question. It would be interesting, for instance, to see if Weigel and others like him accept Catholic Social Doctrine on the universal destination of goods and the teaching that private property is under a social mortgage for the common good. This seems to fly in the face of the Catholic (economic) right’s rhetoric and focus on individuals keeping the money and goods which “belong to them.” At least if one does not dissent from Catholic Social Doctrine, what one has earned does not “belong to them”–indeed, it may even be licitly taken by others in great need without it constituting theft. Why? Because it is a Catholic doctrine that all private property ultimately belongs to the common good with a preference for the poor.
It would also be interesting to see if Weigel (and Garnett) would accept the same doctrine/policy distinction when it comes to life issues. Suppose a Catholic politician says that she supports all of the Church’s doctrines on the sanctity of human life, the prohibition against killing persons, and duties to aid vulnerable populations. But then let us suppose she has a broadly pro-choice voting record because she believes the Church, in calling for legal protection of our prenatal children, is speaking about a technical area of public policy about which it has no expertise or authority. Suppose she believes that laws against abortion would be virtually unenforceable and harm women. Suppose she argued that the kind of big government necessary to monitor women’s reproductive choices poses a serious danger for the common good. Suppose she thought that the best way to save prenatal life was by creating the social conditions in which women would be more likely to freely choose to keep their child. On this basis, then, could she vote for pro-choice legislation, against pro-life justices, etc., without publicly dissenting from Catholic teaching?
Update:
Garnett has responded (by updating the link posted above) already, and I’m grateful because it gives me a chance to make some things more clear. He is right, in my view, to reject the “I’m pro-life but think we should continue excluding unborn children, because they are unborn, from the protections the law provides to other human beings against lethal violence” position. He is also right in saying that the Church teaches that it is fundamentally unjust to discriminate against one class of human persons.
But the Catholic pro-choice politician I’m asking Garnett (and others) to consider does not need to worry about either of these concerns. Given what I said about her above, she would say, yes, it is fundamentally unjust to discriminate against one class of persons, and, yes, I don’t believe that unborn children should be excluded from protections of the law simply because they are unborn children. Remember, this person accepts all the moral truths about the personhood of the fetus, the wrongness of killing her, etc…but she also says, as Garnett does, that “to identify a moral truth is not to identify the best, let alone the morally required, policy or law.” Why couldn’t she say that people like Garnett and Camosy who want to use the law to protect the agreed-upon dignity of our prenatal children by restricting abortion just don’t understand the practical implications of doing it this way? As mentioned above, she rejects pro-life (in this case it would be more accurate to say “anti-abortion”) laws because she believes they are unenforceable (and will therefore not protect any babies), hurt women, and create an intrusive, big government solution to the problem.
Now, to be clear, I disagree with some of her practical and prudential judgments (in particular, Ireland has shown that laws restricting abortion can do what this politician says they would not), but can we really say that her support of pro-choice laws and justices (on the basis described above and no other) dissents from Church doctrine? At least if we set up the doctrine/policy relationship the way that Garnett and Weigel have done, it seems that she has not. Our disagreement with her is about practical matters of public policy, something about and over which Garnett and Weigel claim the institutional Church has no particular expertise or authority.
Charles,
I agree with you here. Something Father Komonchak said in a discussion three years ago on dotCommonweal has always stuck in my mind. It was on the question of withholding communion from politicians, but I think it is relevant here.
It seems to me a politician (or a voter) could be in perfect agreement with all the Church positions on abortion and yet never find them in pure enough form in American political life to vote for them.
Charlie,
I value the distinction you’re making here and think you’re right to call for consistency. I also agree with Weigel and Garnett about the need to evaluate all public policies on practical grounds. I would add two points:
1. Although the church does not have particular expertise on public policy, it does have a vision of the common good, a theory of the place of government in fulfilling the common good, and a long history of applying that good to specific social problems. Catholic Social Teaching is valuable both in its general principles and its specific conclusions, though each carries different weight.
2. John Courtney Murray, SJ’s discussion of the limits of the state and of politics is crucial. We can’t and shouldn’t make everything that is immoral illegal. In politics, our responsibility is to adopt the most practical plan for achieving our goals. If one politician is publicly pro-choice but politically committed to certain policies that can be shown to reduce abortion, the burden of proof seems to be on the pro-life voter who supports the opposing politician who is committed to making abortion illegal but cannot do so, and whose economic, social, and healthcare policies are associated with higher abortion rates.
It seems to me if you accept the position that a Catholic can validly oppose anti-abortion laws because of practical considerations you have no argument that Catholic social teaching in toto has any meaning at all. If I can morally support the legalization of abortion then I can morally support anything with the “Yes (I accept CST) but (it can’t be implemented because of X, Y, and Z)” argument.
Either the term “intrinsic evil” is meaningful or it isn’t, but if it is then there is no argument that allows it … including the one presented above. I believe that CST provides guidelines which allow people to legitimately take opposing positions on practical solutions to social problems. For abortion, however, along with a mere handful of other issues, we are presented not with guidelines but with a clear, inflexible command: these things are not allowed under any circumstances and must be opposed.
If you accept the position that “our responsibility is to adopt the most practical plan for achieving our goals” then you need to recognize that moral concerns are no longer relevant. The new standard is whatever works. Abortion is different in kind from CST and if you can rationalize supporting politicians who publicly support an intrinsic evil then you have no argument whatever against that politician you believe is failing to follow the guidelines of CST. If the stronger argument is insufficient then the weaker one is surely useless.
Ender, this doesn’t seem quite right. CST is not a bunch of practical proposals–it makes authoritative statements objective truths. For instance, that God has (and we should have) a special concern for the poor, that all private property is directed toward the common good, etc. How best to address these truths through public policy is one thing, and CST does also talk about these kinds of questions, but it does make doctrinal claims as well…from which many Catholics on the right appear to dissent.
Furthermore, at least in the tradition, the claim that an act is intrinsically (which does not mean “very”) evil is a moral one…it is a separate question of how best that moral truth ought best to be expressed via public policy. For instance, though he thought that the practice was intrinsically evil, Thomas Aquinas nevertheless supported the legal status of prostitution. Do you think he was in error?
Charles – As you state, CST is not a bunch of practical proposals; it provides guidelines, not prescriptions. The teaching on abortion, however, is of a different kind in that it is quite specific and allows for only one position. My point is simply this: if practical considerations allow us to override the unambiguous prohibition against abortion then surely they allow us to override the generic guidelines found in CST.
That being the case, citing CST in support of your position on, say, immigration or the budget is really a waste of time inasmuch as the same argument you used to override the abortion teaching is available to everyone else to use to override whatever you believe is found in CST.
Once you make the argument that practical considerations trump moral rules you have no defense against the argument that they also trump moral guidelines.
Ender,
I suggest not that practical considerations trump moral rules, but that moral goods can be pursued in different, more and less effective ways, and moral evils can be opposed in different, and more and less effective ways. Politics is the art of the possible, and because much of what Christians want simply isn’t possible in any modern nation-state, compromise and creative action are necessary. (This is why even the most pro-life of politicians reluctantly accept exceptions for rape and the life of the mother, despite the absolute position of the Catholic tradition. And is it why Rep. Ryan can legitimately claim to uphold CST while questioning many of the programs Catholics have traditionally supported.)
It seems that we both care deeply about savings the lives of babies. Why not join forces instead of opposing each other?
If it is impossible at this time to make abortion illegal across the U.S., the most important thing is not to verbally express opposition to this (though of course we should do that, too). Rather, the key thing is to figure out how to lessen the evil we cannot now stop completely. Shouldn’t we all be studying what sorts of educational interventions, youth group programs, health care policies, sex education programs, chastity programs, crisis pregnancy centers, family dynamics, etc., lead women and girls to avoid unwanted pregnancy and choose life when pregnancies do occur?
Julie – I agree that moral goods can be pursued in a great variety of ways and we may legitimately disagree over what means will work even as we agree over the ends we are attempting to secure. What I am addressing is the question Charles posed in his article: “On this basis, then, could she vote for pro-choice legislation, against pro-life justices, etc., without publicly dissenting from Catholic teaching?” The answer here is no. There are some things we are prohibited from doing regardless of our intention and regardless of our belief as to the probable outcome of our actions. Supporting a law enabling abortion is one of those things.
Even if you disagree with me on this point surely you must agree that if you can find justification for supporting abortion laws – an act (abortion) that is unequivocally condemned by the Church – you have no basis for denying me the same right when I find justification for supporting actions that you believe violate CST. If it is not a violation of Church teaching to support abortion laws then it is hard to see how any action could be judged in violation of those laws.
To argue that it is morally justifiable to support permissive abortion laws is essentially a claim that moral law is subservient to our personal political views. If Church teaching does not hold on this point then there is no teaching that can bind us; in every case we can make the same objection: practical considerations are paramount. These means – permissive abortion laws – are denied us. To support such laws with the claim that they are the more effective alternative is to claim that the ends justify the means. It may be tactically attractive to say yes to Charles’ question but it is strategically catastrophic.
Ender…your second paragraph is what I want to focus on. I just want Catholics on the right (and left) to be consistent: if they are going to say “I don’t support the minimum wage because, though it is taught by the Church as a matter of justice, it is a practical proposal for how to express a doctrine like the preferential option for the poor or the universal destination of goods…and therefore doesn’t have authoritative weight”…then, if they are consistent, they must accept the claim of (some) Catholics on the left who say “I don’t support the banning of abortion, though it is taught by the Church as a matter of justice, because it is a practical proposal for how to express a doctrine like the sacredness of human life and the intrinsic evil of aiming at the death of an innocent person…and therefore it doesn’t have authoritative weight.”
What both agree on here is that, while the Church doesn’t get doctrines (the POPF, universal destination of goods, sanctity of human life, intrinsic evil of killing an innocent person, etc.) wrong, it could (and does) get public policy proposals wrong. Can you offer an argument as to why a pro-choice Catholic legislator–who accepts all the pro-life doctrines as true–would be dissenting by voting for pro-choice legislation ONLY because she disagreed with the practical claims of the Church about whether anti-abortion legislation actually would save the lives of our prenatal children?
Perhaps you would argue that the Church’s view is that such anti-abortion legislation is such a fundamental question of justice for the unborn, and follows so closely from the doctrine, that it must be supported. But then this is what many will say about the minimum wage and its relationship to justice for the poor. Either way, just be consistent.
Also, let me pin you down on this: do you think Thomas was dissenting with regard to a matter of doctrine when he supported permissive laws for what he thought was the intrinsic evil of prostitution? If not, how can you say that this Catholic legislator is dissenting with regard to a matter of doctrine?
Ender,
Just to be clear, I do not take the position Charlie is proposing here. That is, I would support legislation banning abortion if I were offered the chance to vote for it.
But I have never faced this situation. Rather, as a voter I am faced with two candidates, neither of whom perfectly represents Catholic social teaching, each of whom has limited ability to carry out what he advocates. In this case, I have many practical considerations to weigh. Given the limited effects previous pro-life politicians have had on abortion, and limited potential for change at the level of law, I place more hope in alternative strategies for reducing the number of abortions. This affects not only the way I vote, but my volunteering and charitable giving. This seems to me an appropriate use of prudence, which fits within the framework of Faithful Citizenship.
Charlie,
Do you think the intrinsic evil of abortion as well as the gravity of the evil distinguishes it from minimum wage legislation, which could be seen one way among many of guaranteeing the payment of just wages? Do you want to place all political decisions in the same category of practical judgement or are distinctions still needed?
Julie, while the gravity of the evil should certainly be a major factor in discussion about the practicalities of public policy, that alone (in my view) could not be the basis of a public policy itself. Suppose a sociologist convinced this legislator that bans on abortion would cause two things to happen: (1) rich people would go somewhere else to get their abortion and (2) poor and middle-class people would get underground abortions and increase the likelihood that they will get hurt. Again, let us suppose that this legislator is also a member of the Tea Party and is skeptical of the harm done to the common good by the kind “big government” necessary to properly enforce this law. She maintains that abortion is grave evil, but then decides that–because of practical considerations alone–the best way to resist that grave evil is not to ban abortion. Indeed, she thinks that banning abortion wouldn’t save the life of any child, but would hurt women and create yet another dangerous arm of big government.
For the record, once again, I disagree with her about these practical matters, but I’m not sure how we can say that she is at variance with Catholic doctrine. Our argument is about how best to honor that doctrine via public policy.
Ender, you say that CST is a bunch of guidelines, but I don’t think that is true. The preferential option for the poor and the universal destination of goods are doctrines, not guidelines. The practical guidelines in CST (minimum wage, universal health care, etc.) are up for discussion, but CST says that they follow from certain doctrines, and there are Catholics on the right who appear to dissent from these doctrines.
It is difficult for me to understand why you think that “the teaching on abortion is different.” It also proposes doctrines and public policies, and why should we take its suggestions about public policies more seriously with regard to life issues that with regard to other social issues? If it has no special expertise or authority with regard to how best to put a preferential option for the poor into a public policy, then the Church also has no special expertise or authority with regard to how best to put the sanctity of life into a public policy.
I appreciate being pushed on this, Julie and Ender, can you help me understand what I’m missing here?
Charles – You’ve given me a lot to respond to. Regarding CST and abortion, I consider them different in kind. CST offers us guidelines, objectives toward which we should direct our proposals, but it does not identify those proposals itself. The teaching on abortion is different: it is specific and allows for only one position. We may properly disagree on solutions to immigration and the budget because the Church leaves it to us to work them out; she insists only that we work them out in as fair and balanced a manner as possible. This is not the case with abortion where she unequivocally condemns laws that allow it. There is no alternative here, no room for legitimate disagreement. I do not consider the Church’s position to be merely a practical proposal – which we could legitimately reject – it is rather a moral law which we must observe.
It is certainly reasonable to expect consistency from both sides in the arguments they use on different subjects but if there are fundamental differences in the subjects then there is no inconsistency in having fundamental differences in the arguments and, as I said, I consider abortion to be fundamentally different from CST.
Regarding Aquinas, I know he said this:
“Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like.” (ST II-II 10,11ad1)
His position on prostitution is reasonable if he did not regard it as a grievous vice either because he did not believe a sufficient percentage could abstain or that it was not hurtful to others. He clearly would not have included abortion in that category.
This debate reminds me of one we had a couple months ago… indeed, this is a debate we keep having. It makes me sad.
Let’s try this. The Church has three authoritative teachings (and lots more, but most of our arguments focus on these three!). About life, about sex, and about property. All these things have definitive natures, and the natures of these things are what ground so-called moral absolutes (killing, theft, and adultery – but note that the list of negative prohibitions that flow from each of these is longer in the Catechism – euthanasia, tax fraud, and premarital sex, for example). A socialist state that denied any right of property is deemed unacceptable in the encyclical tradition; so are capitalist societies where there is no limitation on private property. A state that allowed frequent killing would be unacceptable, as would a state that mounted unjust wars
The official teaching on property makes it clear that Catholics are obliged to use property for the sake of the common good, and especially for those in need. It also requires that they not accumulate this property through unjust means (many of which are named in the Catechism). All of this, it seems to me, is just as authoritative as the teaching on abortion. Abortion may be understood as more grave, but it would be important to separate judgments about gravity from judgments about authority. As Aquinas says, gravity is a crucial consideration when legislators consider what actions to forbid or to restrict.
I think the problem that Charlie is trying to point to here is this: on the one hand, the pro-choice Catholic legislator (let’s call her Ms. Gelwei) actually agrees with the Catholic teaching about the sanctity of life. She herself conforms her own behavior to it. She believes others should too. Presumably she continues to have an obligation to work towards reducing and restricting abortion – as pro-life politicians do – yet she thinks the policy choice of, say, a constitutional amendment banning abortion in all cases (which is the only actual policy option that fully conforms to Church teaching) would be imprudent. She is likely subjected to criticism of her Catholic faithfulness. On the other hand, Mr. Weigel repeatedly and publicly criticizes Church authority, taking positions that suggest he does NOT actually agree with Catholic teaching on the nature of property, as well as thinking certain policy proposals to be imprudent and wrong-headed. He is treated as one of the leading spokesmen of the Catholic faith in America.
It’s the different approaches to Ms. Gelwei and Mr. Weigel, it seems to me, that is… well, scandalous. There is doctrine in both areas, and Catholics in public life seem to me to have a responsibility to show agreement with the doctrine.
Charles – Regarding your tea-party legislator who believes laws banning abortion would be counterproductive and therefore supports laws keeping it legal, she is no different than the person who decides to have an abortion because she feels it is justified because of practical considerations. The Church is clear in both cases: neither an abortion nor laws allowing them are justified and this clear and inflexible prohibition is universally valid. There are no circumstances that allow exceptions in either case.
This is why I keep insisting on the distinction between Church teaching on abortion and CST. Whether or not CST is doctrine doesn’t change the fact that it is also generic and non-specific. “Love your neighbor” is surely doctrine as well but it is not directly translatable into action. If my neighbor is sick it would surely be appropriate for me to cut his grass for the duration of his illness but if he is just lazy then it I certainly have no responsibility to cut it for the duration of his laziness. Helping my neighbor (like CST) is dependent on circumstances. The prohibition against laws allowing abortion is not.
You believe that some Catholics on the Right dissent from the doctrines expressed in CST but I would argue that what you see as dissent from doctrine is merely a tactical disagreement over what actions are best to achieve the objectives CST identifies. I can know that a legislator who supports laws allowing abortion has violated Church teaching. You cannot know that a person who opposes the minimum wage has violated CST because in the former case the Church has been specific in stating what we may not do while in the latter case she has only identified objectives toward which we should strive and the framework within which we must work – but she has said nothing whatever about the specific actions we should take to satisfy those criteria.
Julie – I think it is a mistake to claim that neither party perfectly represents Catholic Social Teaching because it infers that such a thing is possible. We can both be equally serious about trying to satisfy the doctrines it expresses while coming to opposite conclusions about how to put its doctrines into law.
I oppose minimum wage laws. Is that a violation of CST? Given that CST only requires that wages be fair and says nothing about minimum wages, is it actually sinful for me to believe that a minimum wage kills jobs, prices some unskilled laborers out of the market and is on the whole harmful rather than helpful? I may in fact be wrong but the question is whether my economic illiteracy is also a sin. It is one thing to dispute my facts and economic assumptions and claim that both are wrong but it is quite another to claim that my error is a sin.
There is no such doubt about supporting abortion, however, because here the Church does not give guidelines such as “reduce abortion as much as possible”, rather she states unequivocal prohibitions against it and laws that allow it. I may legitimately (even if erroneously) oppose minimum wage laws but you may not legitimately support laws allowing abortion, and if you are morally prohibited from supporting such laws it seems you are on shaky ground claiming you can morally support the politicians who support those laws.
David – It seems to me that your defense of the legislator who morally opposes abortion but, from practical considerations, believes we should have laws that allow it is based solely on her intent. Since it is her intent to reduce abortion it is morally acceptable for her to support permissive abortion laws.
There are two problems with this. First, while the morality of an act may depend largely on intent, the “object chosen” cannot be intrinsically evil or the act is immoral, despite the intent. In the case of the legislator, her intent to reduce the number of abortions does not justify her in supporting laws that allow them as all such laws (the object chosen) are intrinsically evil.
Second, as a practical matter if you accept intent as justification for an action then you have no grounds for charging that someone has violated Catholic Social Teaching since you cannot look at an act and divine the intent behind it. If you can find a way around the Church’s explicit prohibition against permissive abortion laws you cannot deny me the same path around CST. (I deny supporting anything that violates CST but your position on the pro-abortion legislator makes such denial irrelevant.)
Ender, this is getting more clear. Your use of minimum wage here is helpful, because there are economists on both left and right who credibly suggest that it may be detrimental, at least in some ways. So I would agree that there is no requirement that Catholics must support minimum wage legislation.
But I would contest the claim that CST is completely “generic and non-specific.” CST requires a just wage, and the logical corollary (in terms of a real prohibition) is that paying unjust wages is sinful. So let’s say a Catholic opposes minimum wage laws on the grounds you suggest. What else is necessarily required? First, I think it is safe to say that labor regulation of some sort is concretely required by CST – say, against unsafe working conditions. (“Unsafe” is prudential, but also obvious in many cases) Second, CST makes clear that a just wage cannot simply be whatever wage the market determines. Market wages CAN be just wages, but they can also be unjust (otherwise, there would be no moral teaching required!). The primary concern of CST is, as stated repeatedly in the encyclicals, that the bargain struck between the laborer and the employer in a society where there are few alternatives to wage labor structurally puts the employer in a position to take advantage of the employees. Given all this, SOME form of legislation seems required by the common good to prevent labor exploitation – that is, the payment of unjust wages. So I would think the Catholic opponent to current minimum wage law has at least an obligation to make clear what alternative legislation would better conduce to the goal. Third, the just wage is not without definition in the tradition – it is a wage that covers reasonable subsistence for a family, with sufficient funds left over for some degree of savings. Even granting the presence of government support mechanisms, such as EITC and SNAP, and even granting the barest minimum of decent existence, it would seem that a just wage will be higher than the current minimum wage. In a recent study for a business in which I participate, we did a living wage calculation for our area for a single person, sharing housing with another person, and with about $100/month in any spending above food, shelter, transportation, and health care. It came out to slightly below $11/hour. So if (by #2) alternative legislation should be suggested, it would also need to credibly show how it would not actually require HIGHER wages than the current law. (I note that one of the difficulties has to do with part-time labor by teenagers or college students working in the summer, or even part-time workers who supplement household income of others who make far more than a living wage, etc. Could minimum wage law be rewritten to create reasonable exemptions for these? Maybe. Again, more questions of prudence.)
In making this case, what I am resisting is the tendency to put CST and abortion in entirely separate categories. One may judge about the relative gravity of such issues. But the issues are of the same type. There are not two types of Catholic moral teaching, one a set of absolutes, and the other a set of guidelines. They are all guidelines (that is, general principles about life, sex, property), which are protected by negative prohibitions.
And I think Charlie’s point is that abortion POLICY (as opposed to the morality of abortion) unavoidably involves judgments that are not different in kind from those about just wages. Catholic legislators may legitimately support bans on late-term abortions, parental consent requirements for minors, waiting periods, even abortion bans with rape and incest exceptions. None of these policies actually matches Catholic teaching on abortion (e.g. abortion is OK, as long as there is parental consent!) – there is only one policy that would do that, which would be a total constitutional ban. Unless one argues that Catholic legislators are absolutely bound in conscience to support ONLY that legislation (because all other legislation falls short), then some kind of pruedntial judgment must be being made about what legislation is possible.
UPDATE: I posted above before your response to me, which is a separate issue. First, your analysis of intent not making an act justifiable if the object of the act is intrinsically evil is correct – but it applies to the act of procuring an abortion, not to making abortion policy. If, say, a legislator makes provisions to pay for abortions, then intent is irrelevant, because the legislator is actually contributing to the act. If a legislator cannot, say, support policies whose intent is to reduce abortions, then neither could they support parental notification laws (i.e. laws that permit abortions with parental consent). If a legislator actually believes sincerely that this choice is a purely private one, that people have the right to choose an abortion, then (i would argue) their intent is also irrelevant, since if they believe that, then they (necessarily) also believe that abortion is not the intentional taking of an innocent life (since they presumably oppose such actions, and would not say people have a “right” to do it).
Second, it is absolutely possible to know something about a person’s intent in doing an act. They can tell you what it is when you ask (which we do all the time). They can announce other things about what they intend more broadly, which are consistent with a particular intent of a particular act that they are doing. And their actions considered as a whole can often give very helpful guidance about what their genuine intentions are (as opposed to what they are “paying lip service to” – the very notion of “lip service” implies that we have some access to intent). Does all of this amount to 100% certainty? No. People are notoriously self-deceived or inconsistent in their intentions. We may be biased in looking at only a subset of their actions. But our judicial system, for example, spends significant amounts of energy trying to determine “intent” as relevant for the punishment of crime. If we were 100% unable to identify intent, then it would never be able to do that.
David – Let me start by trying to clarify what I mean when I say that CST is non-specific. It does not mean that we can make no judgments about whether a specific proposal is just. I agree with you that “some sort” (this statement alone kind of makes my point) of labor regulation is required and, at the margins, we may be able to agree on what is too much or too little and therefore violates CST guidelines. But within the broad middle area no such determination is possible; we disagree in degree, not in kind. This is just what I mean when I state that CST represents objectives and guidelines directing our actions. What it does not do, however, is to directly specify what those actions should be. This is not true of Church teaching on abortion for there she does directly state what actions we may not take. Positive laws (feed the hungry, heal the sick) are contingent on circumstances but negative laws oblige under all circumstances. The law forbidding the legalization of abortion is just such a negative law.
The Church has also addressed the question of support for less than perfect laws, say a law outlawing abortions except for rape or incest.
The situation JPII described is very different from your example. In his case the legislator accepts an imperfect law because he cannot achieve the one he prefers; in your case the legislator prefers the imperfect law. It is one thing to accept a negative consequence and quite another to aim for it.
Regarding intent, it is surely possible to know it and even in some cases to divine it. As you say, courts attempt this regularly. That doesn’t change the fact that you cannot from the action alone discover the intent behind it. No matter what my position on immigration, the budget, healthcare, etc you cannot know whether my intent is evil or I simply support stupid things because I am stupid and uninformed. You therefore cannot claim that (virtually) any proposal by any party is immoral. You may certainly claim that it is stupid and uninformed – a case you are encouraged to make – but (except at the extreme) you cannot claim it is sinful because there you are judging the intent behind the proposal which in the case of politicians is something you cannot know … unless they fess up and admit their evil intentions – and I won’t hold my breath awaiting that.
Representative Ryan (e.g.) claims his budget is based on his understanding of CST. Some bishops and any number of prominent Catholics (see: Georgetown) have decried it as immoral. Whether or not Ryan is lying we cannot know. What we can know is that there is no basis to challenge his intent and to condemn his bill on the basis of that rash and uncharitable judgment. If I support his bill because I want all the negative outcomes others claim it will cause then my support is immoral. If Ryan supports it because he disputes those claims and believes it is the best possible option then his support is moral. We both support the same bill but his act in supporting it is moral while mine is immoral. The bill itself is neither.
While the current U.S. context may not allow for the elimination of unjust wars and abortion or the protection of the poor, Catholics should seek to move the state in that direction. My issue with the inconsistency that Charlie is challenging is that Catholics use the term Catholic to justify their consumer choices and party alliances and actually do nothing to encourage the principles they say they personally hold to be true.
If Weigel were serious about Catholic social teaching, he would not speak of the “fruitless energies” bishops exert to protect the poor or spend time re-defining just war theory. His arguments would place preferential option for the poor front and center and his tone would be more respectful towards Catholic social teaching and the bishops.
At the same time, Catholic politicians or journalists cannot support every legal expansion and funding of abortion while claiming to be personally against abortion. If such politicians were serious about serving the unborn in a practical way, then they would, for example, propose legislation to outlaw abortion in the last trimester. I suspect that they lack consistency in these ways because they are more focused or concerned about their party or the power derived from their occupations than their faith.
Ender, I am sympathetic with what you say about abortion being a more fundamental issue. Yet, it is precisely my concern for the fundamental nature of abortion that makes me value what Charlie is saying. When Weigel dismisses Church teaching he makes Church teaching irrelevant in a way that promotes the dismissal of Church teaching on the issue of abortion.
Kevin: First, I dispute your characterization of Weigel’s comments. He did not speak of the “fruitless energies” the bishops spent “to protect the poor.” He objected to the fruitless energies spent “defending the social welfare state as we know it.” That’s a rather significant difference and the argument about the effectiveness of welfare programs and the welfare state structure is entirely political. There is no moral dimension whatever in that debate so it is quite reasonable to question the involvement of the bishops and the USCCB in such a discussion.
What I have consistently objected to in this and various other discussions is the idea that political issues involve struggles between good guys and bad guys; the good guys of course being those who want to (e.g.) help the poor and the bad guys who don’t care about them. This is the implication given when bishops present their political solutions as if they were moral judgments.
I also dispute your characterization of Weigel as dismissing Church teaching. That is not true for the simple reason that the Church has no specific teachings on the solutions to social problems which one could dismiss. This is the other point I’ve been trying to make. Since I’ve been ineffectual in that regard I’ll let BXVI speak to the issue:
The bishops committee is supporting the welfare programs with the goal of protecting the poor. They might be off on this and I for one would like to see them give more account of the federal debt. However, I disagree with offering a critique of the committee’s support without presenting alternatives. The answer cannot be remove these programs and forget about the poor. Maybe Weigel gives due consideration for the preferential option for the poor elsewhere so my goal is not to bad name Weigel. My point is that to say that the Church offers no technical solutions and does not want to interfere in any way in the politics of States can’t mean that I get to pick and choose which principles of Catholic social teaching I am going to focus on or that the Church has nothing to offer. Weigel’s line of thought at the end of the referenced article looks a lot like those who say they are personally against abortion and do nothing to prevent it. They argue that it is ok to support legislation that decreases grave evil and that they are offering a technical solution to decrease abortions. Further, they argue, the bishop’s conference just doesn’t get it or worse, the Church should have no say.
The objective of the bishop’s committee is surely protecting the poor but you uncharitably judge Weigel’s intent if you assume that his objective is different. The issue has never been whether or not to aid the poor but about which approaches will best supply such aid.
This is not at all to say that since the choice of solutions is ours we are free to choose whatever we like only that there is no justification whatever for claiming that the rejection of your (or a handful of bishops’) political policies constitutes a rejection of Catholic Social Teaching.
It is not that the Church should have no say in the matter; it is that neither CST nor anything else in Church teaching specifies how we should go about healing the sick and feeding the hungry. These are technical problems, not moral ones. If you grant that Weigel cares for the poor as much as anyone else you would have no moral ground to object to his position. You might claim his solutions are foolish but that is not a moral failing and is a very different argument than the one being made.
Ender: Can I get direct answers to these questions?
1. Do you accept the Catholic Social Teaching that private property is ultimately directed toward the common good?
2. Do you accept the Catholic Social Teaching that wages should be determined by considerations of justice, and not just the workings of the market?
These are matters of doctrine, not specific public policies.
Charles: If those statements are matters of doctrine then of course I accept them. That really isn’t the issue. Telling us that wages must be just tells us nothing about whether a specific wage is in fact a just one. On that point there can and will be great disagreement and it cannot be assumed that someone who supports the lower wage is unconcerned with justice, which is pretty much where these discussions tend to lead.
Justice requires a fair wage, but does it therefore require a minimum wage? In my opinion it does not. Am I mistaken? Possibly. Is my (presumed) mistake a sin? Definitely not. My acceptance that wages must be just does very little to help me determine what that means in practice. It should also be pointed out that that two people could be doing essentially the same job for the same wage and one could be a just salary and the other unjust. It is not merely the level of the salary or the needs of the worker that must be considered but the economic health of the employer as well and on all these practical questions the Church is silent.
Weigel: claim one: welfare programs are ineffective; claim two: ineffective programs should be decreased or eliminated; claim three: the bishop’s committee wants to expand ineffective programs; claim four: the bishops have no expertise in the technicalities of public policy; claim five: “Everyone familiar with the situation knows that this has had far more to do with the political predilections of certain conference staff members than with the settled judgment of the American episcopate—or with a careful application of the principles of Catholic social doctrine. But things are changing.”
I am not challenging Weigel’s intent, nor am I focused on his conclusion. I am concerned about the way in which he presents claims four and five without: 1) stating that the bishop’s committee is right to be concerned for the poor; 2) offering an alternative approach to care for the poor; and 3) reconciling the fact that the bishops have no authority on this matter with his concern that the bishop’s committee might be changing towards his position in the future.
The argument as written (not intent or conclusion) looks a lot like an argument someone would make who does not support legislation that legally limits abortion:
claim one: abortion is evil; claim two: abortions should be decreased or eliminated; claim three: legislating to legally limit abortion is not possible;
claim four: legislating to decrease abortions is possible; claim five: the bishop’s committee supports legislating to legally limit abortion; claim six: the bishops have no expertise in the technicalities of public policy; claim seven: everyone familiar with the situation knows that this has had far more to do with the political predilections of certain conference staff members (or bishops) than with the settled judgment of the American episcopate—or with a careful application of the principles of Catholic social doctrine. But things are changing.
In such arguments, I am particularly concerned with claims six and seven when they lack: 1) an affirmation that the bishop’s committee is right to be concerned with the unborn; 2) a clear explanation of how their legislation will decrease abortions without violating other Catholic moral principles; and 3) reconciling the fact that the bishops have no authority on this matter with concern that the bishop’s committee might be changing towards his position in the future.
This is for Ender – sorry I didn’t reply to the previous reply on my thread. It was getting long – I think I will be doing a separate post on this sometime in the near future.
But to follow up on Charles’ questions and your reply, I think a key problem here is when you state “Telling us that wages must be just tells us nothing about whether a specific wage is in fact a just one.” Nothing?? But in fact the teaching on the just wage has actual CONTENT, just as the just war teaching has content. The content means that it does tell us something – perhaps a lot! – about whether a specific wage is just. It is pretty clear, for example, that a consistently-profitable company that pays minimum or near-minimum wages to its employees over long periods of time is doing something unjust. Moreover, as I posted earlier, the government certainly does have a responsibility in cST to protect workers from exploitation, if employers take advantage of workers. If the minimum wage is seen as a poor way to do that (and certainly there is a case for this), then the real question is: what is the alternative proposed. If NO alternative is proposed, it seems we can discern that CST is not being followed.
David: Let me address some of your assertions. First, your claim that it is unjust to pay a minimum wage if the company paying them is comfortably profitable. Let’s assume for a moment that this is so: what should the government’s role be? Do you think it advisable to grant a bureaucratic agency the authority to rate the profit margin of any business in the country and determine what it thinks the company ought to pay its employees? Remember, what is being addressed here is what government policy ought to be. It is one thing to say that “private property should be directed to the common good” but quite another to claim that this grants government the authority to seize private property whenever it decides it can better allocate it – or the right to tell a business what it must pay its employees.
Second, we clearly disagree over what we believe is worker exploitation and disagree further over what means are appropriate to deal with it. It is not sufficient to claim that some business practice constitutes exploitation when the term is so loosely defined. Why should I accept your opinion on the issue when it is clearly contrary to my own? Beyond that, however, lies the question of what should be done even assuming your opinion is correct? The Church says we should feed the poor but she assuredly does not say if your neighbor does not voluntarily live up to his moral obligation you are justified in forcing his actions. If you want to argue that the Church should use her moral authority to influence the actions of CEO’s fine but I reject utterly the idea that any government should be given authority to dictate the wages companies should pay.
Finally, there is no justification in claiming that if someone opposes a solution without offering one of his own you can “discern that CST is not being followed.” A proposal stands or falls on its own merit and I can legitimately point out its flaws and reject it without offering one of my own. I do not have to explain the physics of electricity to reject the belief that lightening bolts are sparks from Thor’s hammer.
Kevin: Your characterizations of Weigel’s comments are too loose. He did not claim (in the referenced article) that “welfare programs are ineffective.” What he said was that “the welfare state as we have known it is dying – and in fact deserves to die.” I am sure he would acknowledge that some welfare programs have been effective but his point is that the “welfare state” – the entire package of programs and their implementation – is faulty and should be scrapped because it is “grossly inefficient” and has “eroded the moral culture that makes free and responsible citizenship in self-governing democracies possible.” That is a much more serious and reasoned objection than claiming merely that welfare programs are ineffective.
Regarding what you ascribe to Weigel as “his” claim four (bishops have no expertise in the technicalities of public policy), this claim is surely true. Why should we expect – or want – it to be otherwise?
Your concluding assumption that “his” argument looks similar to arguments made by someone who opposes laws limiting abortion misses the crucial point. While it is true that bishops lack expertise in the “technicalities of public policy”, no expertise is needed regarding abortion laws. There is no judgment necessary as to whether permissive laws would be more effective than outright prohibition: we are informed as a matter of doctrine that laws permitting abortion are wrong. End of discussion. This is no longer a practical evaluation but a moral choice, and here statements from bishops carry moral authority because they are (in this case) stating the doctrine of the Church.
Ender, first let me say that I very much respect you mixing it up with us and that I admire you ability to make your arguments clearly, with force and passion, and yet with civility and respect.
Second, however, let me say that I just don’t understand how you can make the claims you do about abortion public policy. Why is “no judgment necessary” to determine whether “abortion law x” or “abortion law y” would be more effective in saving prenatal lives? Suppose, once again, a sociologist tells you that outright prohibition of abortion wouldn’t save the life of one baby and would hurt women. You disagree (and I disagree), but our disagreement with this sociologist is not about a matter of Catholic doctrine…it is about a technical matter of public policy. With respect, you are simply incorrect when you say that “no judgment is necessary” here. We need to examine the technicalities of how a public policy proposal prohibiting abortion impacts that lives of the prenatal children which the law is designed to protect.
In short, you give us no basis for considering *abortion* public policy proposals as “doctrine” but *economic* public policy proposals as “not doctrine” other than raw assertion. Given your facility in making substantive arguments, I feel comfortable challenging you to offer more than this in defense of your position.
Charles: Thank you, I have enjoyed the debate and appreciate your willingness to continue it.
Let us assume for the moment that permissive abortion laws have the positive results their adherents claim. Does this justify laws permitting abortion? No, because the we know we are not allowed to do evil even though good may come of it … and the Church has told us in no uncertain terms that laws permitting abortion are evil and may never be permittede.
This is the fundamental difference between abortion (euthanasia and a mere handful of others) and prudential issues such as immigration and the economy. The Church not only condemns abortion but directly and specifically condemns laws that allow it. She has issued no comparable comments on immigration, the economy, et al.
Regardless of one’s reasons, no law permitting abortion is morally just so a debate over the benefits of such laws is irrelevant. The Church does not, however, tell us what position we must take on the prudential issues. Those are practical debates. Abortion is about moral choices and there is no doubt whatever about what is moral and what is forbidden.
But Ender, I can find similar strongly-worded calls for public policies in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. For instance, #267 claims that the Church’s “social Magisterium responded forcefully and prophetically, affirming universally valid and perennially relevant principles in support of workers and their rights.” #301 says “The rights of workers, like all other rights, are based on the nature of the human person and on his transcendent dignity. The Church’s social Magisterium has seen fit to list some of these rights, in the hope that they will be recognized in juridical systems: the right to a just wage; [651] the right to rest; [652] the right “to a working environment and to manufacturing processes which are not harmful to the workers’ physical health or to their moral integrity.”
There are more, but I take it you dissent from what the Church’s social Magisterium teaches here. But I’m not sure that, given what you have set up with regard to abortion public policy, that you should so dissent. The CSDC claims that these rights are also “inalienable” (#319) and fundamental to the dignity of the human person. If you accept the Church’s teaching that laws against abortion are so fundamental to the dignity of the person that they count as doctrine, then why won’t you accept it when the Church teaches something about social justice?
Furthermore, the pro-choice Catholic I’m proposing here agrees that “laws which legitimize the direct killing of innocent human beings…are in complete opposition to the inviolable right to life proper to every individual; they thus deny the equality of everyone before the law” while still supporting pro-choice laws (which are agnostic about the moral status or killing of our prenatal children) because “public authority can sometimes choose not to put a stop to something which-were it prohibited- would cause more serious harm.” Once again, if she thinks that banning abortion would not protect any babies from being killed and end up hurting more women, then, on the basis of a practical judgment of public policy, she believes such laws banning abortion would “cause a more serious harm.” Note once again that she is not supporting pro-choice laws because the fetus is not a person, or because it is OK to kill a fetus…and she would in fact oppose any such legislation that tried to enshrine either into law. She is making a practical judgment about public policy, and denying nothing about doctrine.
Ender: thank you clarifying Weigel’s critique of the welfare system. Thank you also for pushing further on the question of the role and competence of the bishop’s committee to speak on technical solutions.
I want to try to clarify what I see to be the analogous abortion scenario. I am thinking not of a legislator who is trying to legalize abortion. Permissive laws concerning abortion are already on the books. Think of someone who does not support a bill that would legally limit abortion and the bill never gets the support necessary to come to vote. In such a scenario, a politician might say: “while I am against abortion, I understand better than the bishops committee how to decrease abortions in our current context.”
As you know, there are disagreements among Catholics about how to best protect the unborn in our current context. Should we focus on judges, legislation, or the culture? Even if we focused on legislation and did not include the debates about judges and culture, should the issue be resolved at the state level or the federal level? Should we seek all or nothing or seek change in small increments? If we want all or nothing, should we do so through a constitutional amendment or some other legislation? If small increments, then what increments should we take now?
If a bishop’s committee was to advocate and lobby for a particular bill that would legally limit abortion and not others, would they be making prudential judgments about a technical matter of public policy?
Charles – You can find strongly-worded calls for public objectives in CST but what you cannot find are specific policies that we are either obligated or forbidden to implement. It is true that CST calls for just wages but nowhere is that defined and my disagreement with you over this matter hardly represents dissent from Church teaching. I cannot dissent from a teaching that does not exist and there is no teaching beyond “a worker has a right to a just wage” that tells me either what wages are just or how to enact legislation to ensure that workers receive them.
Nor were my comments on abortion about the fundamental dignity of the person; they were about the Church’s specific prohibition against the implementation of laws allowing it. There is no teaching that we must not abolish the minimum wage, must not deport illegal aliens, or must not support the Ryan budget. There is, however, a teaching that we must not support laws permitting abortion. Your comments about what the pro-choice Catholic believes are not relevant – it doesn’t matter what she believes or even whether her opinion is correct. We are morally obligated to oppose laws legalizing abortion. She cannot support such laws – for any reason at all – without rejecting that doctrine. I can, however, disagree with you (within reason) over what constitutes a fair wage because there is no doctrine that defines it.
Show me a doctrine about wages that is as specific as this (the State “can never … legitimize … the disregard of so fundamental a right as the right to life.”) and you will have made your point. If you cannot find such a statement then I think you will have made my point. It is in fact not possible for the Church to make any specific comment on fair wages since what is fair is entirely conditional on circumstances – a wage that is fair in one instance could be unfair in a different one. This is not true of laws permitting abortion: they are forbidden in all cases. Circumstances, which control what is fair with regard to wages, are simply irrelevant with regard to abortion.
Kevin: I recognize that disagreements about how best to protect the unborn are valid; those are prudential issues about which disputes may properly arise. The one solution to that question that is forbidden, however, is a law permitting abortion. All or nothing, state or federal, courts or culture … these are fair questions about which we may disagree; the Church has nothing to say on those points.
If bishops were to advocate for a particular approach or a particular bill they would be exercising prudential judgment. This prudential nature does not extend, however, to permissive abortion laws; we are obligated to oppose them and no evaluation of the effectiveness of such laws in reducing abortions is relevant. We may disagree on what measures will work to secure our shared goal of reducing abortions; that is a prudential determination. We may not disagree on opposing a permissive abortion law; that is a moral obligation.
Ender: how do you understand the Church’s prohibition against the implementation of laws allowing abortion? Is it that we shouldn’t support a bill that would make abortion law more permissive? That we have to support every bill that would make it less permissive? That we cannot support any bill that allows some permissiveness? That we have to support every bill that would make it less permissive even if there were add ons to the bill that went against other Church teaching?
Kevin: Re-read my August 4 comment where I cited JPII in Evangelium Vitae commenting on this. I’m afraid I don’t find those questions all that compelling if only because I find those circumstances somewhat rare and the issues of secondary importance. There are prudential questions that are reasonable to ask but the elephant in the living room is this: are we justified in supporting politicians who openly support permissive abortion laws? We as individuals are certainly prohibited from supporting such laws and arguments to the contrary are no more valid for politicians than they are for us.
Ender: Thank you for carrying this conversation with me late into the blog post night.
I agree that we should not support politicians who openly support permissive abortion laws. Catholic politicians who openly support permissive abortion law have argued that they support such laws on the basis of Catholic principles and that causes public scandal and confusion. The following are three reasons why I think it important to recognize the prudential judgments involved in abortion law.
First, we are able to be more precise in our critique of Catholic politicians who are causing scandal on the issue. They might say while they are speaking to a Catholic audience that they disagree with a particular bill because it won’t decrease abortions but then say in other audiences that there is nothing wrong with abortion because it is about women’s rights, health, and freedom. When they are arguing to the Catholic audience, our response should not be to say prudential considerations are not involved. We should say ‘hypothetically, one might be able to make that argument but you cannot make that argument as long as you continue to publically support and encourage permissive abortion laws.’ Further, we can show why we disagree with the “prudential” (and contradictory, confused, or deceitful) argument being made.
Second, pro-lifers have not always been good about seeing the prudential considerations involved in abortion law. All too often, pro-lifers have only asked if a politician is pro-life or not and have not pressed politicians to make commitments about particular legislation. Too often politicians have received the support of pro-life communities and have done little to nothing by means of legislation. I think the pro-life community is becoming more aware of the prudential considerations involved and are beginning to formulate and support legislation that would make abortion law less permissive.
Third, if we engage others on the prudential considerations involved, we will begin to think more fruitfully about these questions and see more clearly how to practically decrease both abortions and the permissiveness of abortion law in our current context.
I also would like to hear more from you about the role and authority of the bishop’s committees. Would the bishop’s pro-life committee overstep their competence, role, and authority, if they were to advocate and lobby for a particular bill (that would legally limit abortion) and not other such bills? I agree that the bishop’s committee on justice and peace has sometimes been too specific in their advocacy and in doing so have overstepped their role. I wonder if the same applies with the pro-life committee’s advocacy and support of particular bills related to abortion? This would be a painful point for me to admit because I think the pro-life committee’s advocacy arm is doing good work but if it is true it might help to clarify the role of the bishops and the bishop’s committees and would not prevent others from engaging in such advocacy.
Kevin: Re point 1 – JPII was explicit when he stated a politician could support a less than perfect bill if he made clear his opposition to abortion. We should unhesitatingly condemn that politician who supports abortion regardless of the prudential argument he makes in reference to a particular bill. We cannot lost the fundamental distinction between the politician who opposes abortion and the one who supports it regardless of their prudential opinions about a particular bill.
Re #2: I am less convinced that this is accurate. There are limits to what anti-abortion legislation can be passed, limits imposed both by the Supreme Court (Roe) and the political makeup of Congress. No matter how strongly one opposes abortion no significant legislation can pass the Senate without 60 votes, something the pro-life side has never had.
Re #3: We should be wary of engaging in prudential discussions with those who support abortion lest the significance of their pro-abortion position get lost in the debate. Prudential disagreements are justifiable while support of abortion is not and we need to ensure that the latter point is not lost in debates about the former.
I share Cardinal Dulles’ concern that when bishops speak out on topics removed from their competence they thereby reduce the influence they exert when their comments are appropriate. That this concern is justified is shown by the passive response of the laity to the bishops words on the threat to religious liberty posed by the HHS regulations. Without their past history it might be reasonable for the bishops to support a specific pro-life bill but, unless they speak with one voice (as they did re HHS) they are probably better off not taking a position. Regarding USCCB committees, the building they work in should be reduced to rubble and the ground sowed with salt.
I like how you critique the advocacy of the bishops and the bishop’s committee with the goal of restoring the authority of the bishops. If they commented less often about particular legislation they could be a stronger voice when they need to speak in a unified voice on a crucial issue like the HHS mandate. I wish Weigel had articulated the same concern in his article when he is discussing the bishop’s committee. I fear that the general audience that he is writing for may take his critique as another reason to dismiss the authority of bishops.
You note that a politician may support a less than perfect bill if he made clear his opposition to abortion. I agree. In an earlier post, you said that one does not have to explain the physics of electricity to reject the belief that lightening bolts are sparks from Thor’s hammer. I think the example of abortion is distinct from electricity in that you are dealing with human life. One cannot simply say I support this less than perfect bill or I do not support this less than perfect bill and then say nothing about the dignity of the pre-born or state one’s opposition to abortion. I had a similar reaction to Weigel’s discussion of welfare. Since here also we are dealing with human life (hungry, homeless, ill), it seems inadequate to critique welfare without even mentioning the need to take care of the poor. The critique itself may stand without mentioning the need to take care of the poor but it is human beings not the critique that is the more crucial issue. Weigel could say, for example, since welfare seems doomed, the bishops might focus on rallying Catholics to think of ways to fill some of the void that will result from the collapse of welfare.
I am not critiquing what Weigel knows or his intentions, but I do think some more clarity in relation to the bishop’s authority and at least a mention of the need to take care of the poor would go a long way. Setting aside the bishop’s authority question, I think similar things could be said about just wage. While one might disagree with particular minimum wage legislation, one should also express the need to seek justice in wages. Further, one should not claim, in other contexts, that wages should be based merely on voluntary contracts.