In tonight’s speech, President Obama had a steep mountain to climb. He needed to explain the United States role in enforcing the United Nations Libyan No-Fly Zone to the American people. Did he accomplish this goal? There will be no clear or single interpretation of this speech. I am confident that if you questioned each of the 15 moral theologians on this website – you would receive 15 different interpretations and readings of both the text and the intervention in Libya itself.
And so, to begin discussion – I would like to highlight one section that jumped out at me in tonight’s speech:
It is true that America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs. And given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests against the need for action. But that cannot be an argument for never acting on behalf of what’s right. In this particular country – Libya; at this particular moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale. We had a unique ability to stop that violence: an international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people themselves. We also had the ability to stop Gaddafi’s forces in their tracks without putting American troops on the ground.
A few years ago, I attended a symposium at Harvard Law School on the Responsibility to Protect. Throughout the day, I was struck by the apprehension and silence in the room every time someone mentioned the words “humanitarian intervention.” Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia…the 1990s simultaneously created both a fear of intervention and a profound sense of guilt over inaction in Rwanda. In particular, the human rights community largely abandoned the language of “humanitarian intervention” and began developing what is now known as “the responsibility to protect doctrine.” The “Summary of the Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) concluded:
the debate about intervention for human protection purposes should focus not on the ‘right to intervene’ but on the ‘responsibility to protect.’ . . . the responsibility to protect implies an evaluation of the [human rights] issues from the point of view of those seeking or needing support, rather than those who may be considering intervention
A favorite of the current UN Secretary General, R2P is a nascent doctrine, which requires significant research by human rights lawyers, philosophers, and theologians. Its laudable intent is to rethink the concept of sovereignty and intervention in light of the state-sponsored atrocities committed against a domestic population – a reality just war theory is not equipped to handle.
Returning to Obama’s speech, I was struck at the extent to which he appeared to be trying to hit the markers for R2P, including the plea for help from the Libyan people. And, in my opinion, beginning to offer the clearest defense of maintaining the no-fly zone without a mandate for regime change – defining the intervention as providing the space for political movement among the people of Libya. (Whether this is realistic or not, remains to be seen.)
I do not have a firm conclusion on the justice and prudence of our engagement in Libya; however, I do think there is a need to evaluate this through the lens of R2P and not Just War Theory. Ultimately, the President did not give an answer to my pressing question – Why Libya? And not, Sudan? Ivory Coast? Bahrain? As an ethical framework, R2P is emerging, hotly debated, and remains shrouded in ambiguity. I am not certain a clear answer to my question currently exists.
As a moral theologian who writes about human rights and R2P, what am I taking away from the President’s speech? – A charge and challenge to think more systematically about how R2P is developing and what Catholic moral theology can offer to the development of this important ethical framework.
Thanks for taking an initial stab at this important matter, Meghan. For now I will only add that R2P has three prongs: 1) the responsibility to prevent; 2) the responsibility to react (Obama says “act”); 3) the responsibility to rebuild. The first prong coincides rather nicely with Glen Stassen’s model of just peacemaking: practices that will help prevent conflict from flaring up in the first place. The second prong includes but is not limited to forceful military action to protect innocent lives and to stop the killing so that settlements/negotiations/diplomacy can hopefully occur. So far the theological-ethical reflection on R2P (which has been little so far, except for at the World Council of Churches) has noted that the second prong, when it comes to military force, employs the basic reasoning and criteria of the just war tradition (just cause, last resort, discrimination, proportionality, etc.). The third prong is not about nation-building, but it does include a responsibility to rebuild basic infrastructure or institutions (e.g., recruiting, vetting, training a new police force) so that conditions are good/just enough and another flareup hopefully won’t occur. That third prong coincides fairly well with what Mark Allman and I call “jus post bellum.” The “Obama doctrine,” in my view, is very much tethered to R2P. In Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict XVI called for the implementation of R2P. The UN in Resolution 1973 is indeed attempting to enforce it, although I am not sure that it has done so well. As the US bishops said a few days ago, the just cause component was present, but they asked good questions about how the action has been carried out so far.
Tobias – I agree completely. This is why I think the Libya provides both the catalyst and the necessity to change the conversation — from Just War Theory to R2P. I also think it sheds light on the complex network of apspects to R2P and PEACEBUILDING activities (not just military actions). The connection to Jus Post Bellum criteria had not occurred to me before, but I think you are pointing to an important development there as well.
Bombing is a rather blunt instrument. Ultimately war is going to be almost always too messy to let one judge a military intervention as an action that merely protects and doesn’t itself escalate the armed effects of war. This is why B16 has quickly moved to now call for an end to armed conflict, not for more violent “protection”. The only real way to protect civilians threatened by the crossfire and byproducts of war is to force belligerents to stop fighting each other. But forcing them to stop fighting almost always entails fighting them, and in actual politics usually means picking one side over the other and helping it win. Does this protect more in the long run, given the ripple effect of military interventions? It seems rather doubtful to me. In Libya there isn’t just a no-fly zone, there are assaults on the Gaddafi military, ostensibly to take away their ability to cause harm to those being protected, but more likely deacribed as simply a choice of one side in a civil war.
I am glad you included this sentence, Meghan: ” Its [R2P’s] laudable intent is to rethink the concept of sovereignty and intervention in light of the state-sponsored atrocities committed against a domestic population – a reality just war theory is not equipped to handle.” What is important about R2P and what is not coming through in the coverage concerning Libya is that R2P is the first major modification in the Westphalian system of international relations between “sovereign” nation-states since 1648, which is to say ever. It puts into international law the key principle that when a government is not or cannot protect its own people, it has mitigated or entirely lost its claim to sovereignty, and thus other nations can and should intervene to do so.
The ambiguity about whether the current international campaign in Libya is aimed at regime change — i.e. removing Qaddafi — flows directly from this key principle. Intervening to protect the civilian population is legal and legitimate according to international law because the Qaddafi regime has lost some or all of its legitimacy, its claim to sovereignty. But then if his is not the legitimate government of Libya, that implies that he ought to go — and that raises the question of whether he can be removed.
I do hear the Obama administration trying to finesse this by explaining that the goal of the military operation is to protect civilians, but that it is working through nonmilitary diplomatic channels and sanctions to remove Qaddafi. But at best that sort of nuance doesn’t get through media filters. And at worst, reality isn’t so clean, because bombing does aid the anti-Qaddafi rebels, and their own claim to legitimacy is barely nascent.
Notice that I am not taking a stand on the Libya campaign per se. I am simply trying add to the naming of the uncertainty that many people are facing. I feel about this much the same as I felt about Obama’s Nobel speech. In a 20-50 year time frame we may look back and see a decisive step in the direction of a system of international law built on multilateralism not superpower supremacy — or what some of our more radical friends quickly name as “Empire”. But it may take that long until we can look back and be sure we weren’t in fact seeing the development of a more subtle and cagey form of Empire that uses noble notions such as humanitarian intervention and R2P to hide its true motives.
I think that Kevin Clarke’s reflection on this is pretty solid over at America: http://americamagazine.org/blog/entry.cfm?blog_id=2&entry_id=4066.
One question a lot of people, including my Methodist friend Debra Dean Murphy (http://debradeanmurphy.wordpress.com/2011/03/29/the-real-march-madness/) are raising is, Why not Sudan, Yemen, or Bahrain? While it is indeed possible that the nations implementing this action under UN auspices have ulterior motives concerning Libya, I believe that Obama is sincere about wanting to keep this focused on protecting innocent civilians (I would make it clearer, though, that civilians need to be protected from all sides, including the rebel forces). From my study of R2P over the last couple of years, I am aware that the UN is indeed implement elements of the first prong of R2P (the responsibility to prevent) in Sudan, and that they have not implemented the second prong (responsibility to react) because of doubts about probability of success and proportionality at this time. In response to this question, though, William Galston, in an interview at Religion & Ethics Newsweekly (http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/episodes/march-25-2011/moral-questions-and-libya-intervention/8443/) put it this way: “We don’t have a greater obligation than we did before, but it’s important to note that we don’t have an obligation to be everywhere for the very simple reason that we don’t have the capacity to be everywhere. An example that I sometimes use is a lifeguard walking along the edge of a beach hears someone crying out from offshore. Is there an obligation to assist every drowning person? No. But there is certainly an obligation on the lifeguard’s part to assist that one if he or she can.”
I agree with Gerry that we may be looking at a turning point in understanding multilateral actions and responsibilities in a different way. At least, this is my hope – that 20-50 years ago it will be that and not a new more insidious form of empire. I also think the drowning example applies – one’s responsibility is different if one is a lifeguard walking along the beach or a person who cannot swim walking along the beach…..capability to do something is related to the responsibility to act.
For me the why not Sudan? question is not based on the responsibility to do something EVERYWHERE – but that I would like clearer guidelines and principles to determine when it is prudent, just and necessary to respond. I think the ability to be effective and the request for help from the population under attack are two of the principles needed. I do not want Sudan or Bahrain to be an excuse to ignore Libya but a clearer sense that it is moral principles, not US self-interest or fancy that determines when action is morally permissible or required.
I think the virtue of humility is central to any proposal to justify war. Is an action really protective? Is it not causing more byproducts of violence? Is it not just a cover for other political interests? Is it not just intervening on one side of a conflict? (Are we bombing rebel armies before *they* attack Libyan cities so as to save the civilians therein from the effects of war, and if not, why not?) I also think it is too easy to dismiss “US self-interest” when that self-interest actually coincides with humility. There is a lot to be said for modesty that could lead the US not to bomb and fight around the world because of “self-interest” or lack thereof. It is a good thing, not a bad thing, for a government to place procedural obstacles to war such as approval by publicly elected representatives, and flaunting those for a higher cause is not necessarily morally higher, it may just be a lack of humility. The opposite vice of pride can all too easily justify military action, because the weapon in *my* hand is really being done for a good reason authorized by good people and decision-makers unlike those previous people who only went to war for selfish reasons. Political reality, and modesty in the face of it, is necessary so we realize that there may ultimately be no difference whether we think Bush and the cowboy US the bad guys, or Obama and his globalist UN deference the bad guys.